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NON-TENURE TEACHERS: PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS UPON DISMISSAL
The tenure system of hiring and retaining teachers is a common
practice throughout the United States.' The system distinguishes between those teachers who are hired on a permanent basis, generally
removable only for "cause," and the temporary or probationary
teacher who has a year to year contract. Tenure is not a simple concept to describe. It is not a job guarantee as such. It might best be
described as a relationship between a school and a teacher who has the
required amount of teaching experience and time in the educational
hiring unit. Tenure has been descriptively defined as that point in
employment which:
[O]nce attained, does not give the teacher a legal right to his
teaching position. However, the attainment of the tenure status
does guarantee the teacher certain procedures when he or she is
being dismissed or removed from his teaching position. 2
At the present time there are tenure or fair dismissal laws in thirtynine states and the District of Columbia.8
Unlike the teacher with tenure, the probationary or non-tenure
teacher's rights are sharply limited. The probationary teacher must
look to his contract or to various state statutes for protection of his
right to employment. Ohio's code provision is typical of the type of
system with which the non-tenure teacher deals:
Any teacher employed under a limited contract, and not eligible
to be considered for a continuing contract, is, at the expiration
of such limited contract, deemed, re-employed under the provisions of this action at the same salary plus any increment provided by the salary schedule unless the employing board, acting
on the superintendent's recommendation as to whether or not the
teacher should be re-employed, gives such teacher written notice
1. See dissenting opinion in Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 810 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. granted 40 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1971).
2. Vacca and O'Brien, Teacher Tenure: What Does It Mean?, 47 PEABODY JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, 280, 281 (1969); see also E. BOLMIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL
STRUCTURE

157-8 (1968).

3. Research Division, National Education Association, NEA Research Bulletin,
March 1971, at 17. For a comprehensive study and compilation of teacher tenure
laws in the states see: Research Division, National Education Association, Teacher
Tenure and Contracts (1971) (in process).
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of its intention not to re-employ him on or before the thirtieth day
of April. Such teacher is presumed to have accepted such employment unless he notifies the board in writing to the contrary on
or before the first day of June, and a written contract
for the suc4
ceeding school year shall be executed accordingly.

Generally, under the provisions of the statutes, the teacher has no
right to demand and receive reasons for the non-renewal of a contract. One might suggest that the teacher has contracted for no more.
Over the last few years a number of cases have litigated the issue of
whether the probationary teacher's rights are confined to the contract.
Should a teacher have a right to know the reasons for non-renewal of
a contract? What if the teacher alleges that the school board has
fired him for exercising the constitutional right to speak? Is the
question as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed in Pred v.
Board of Public Instruction that:
The right sought to be vindicated is not a contractual one, nor
could it be since no right to re-employment existed. What is at
stake is the vindication of constitutional rights-the right not to
be punished by the State or to suffer retaliation at its hand because a public employee persists in the exercise of First Amendment rights. 5
As recent cases show, teachers without tenure are not limiting their
demands for procedural safeguards to situations involving alleged first
amendment violations. They are seeking to find the extent of their
procedural rights as professional educators and employees of the
state. They are asking the courts to decide who should shoulder the
burden of going forward with reasons and evidence when there is a
dispute over continued employment. The courts' answers have not
been consistent, and the issue remains unresolved.
The arguments offered by the teachers involve two areas of controversy: rights of employment in general, and the protection of constitutional rights ancillary to teaching. The teachers argue that by
state action they are being deprived of a right to pursue their profession.6 Further, they contend that before the state should be able
to deprive a teacher of the right to teach, he has at least the right to
know the reason for his dismissal, and quite possibly should have the
4. OHio REv. CODE § 3319.11 (Supp. 1970).
5. 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969). This article is limited to a discussion of
the procedural rights of non-tenure public school teachers. There is no attempt to
deal with the situation of private schools where a lack of state action may remove
the issue of job protection from the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
6. Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. granted 403 U.S. 917
(1971).
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right to a hearing on the issue. The argument as expressed in Roth
v. The Board of Regents of State Colleges and Drown v. Portsmouth
School District is that the interest of the teacher in a continuation of
employment outweighs the limited degree of inconvenience to the
school boards to provide the teacher with reasons for dismissal.7 In
the development of the argument some teachers might go so far as to
say that they have a right to the collection of rights usually summarized in the term due process. Courts, and particularly federal
courts of appeals, have answered these claims in a conflicting-or
apparently conflicting manner.
The controversy among circuits may be resolved by the Supreme
Court when it decides the case of Sinderman v. Perry." The Perry
court has said in substance that if a teacher alleges that he can show a
violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right under the fourteenth
amendment, the teacher may seek relief in federal court.9 Sinderman, a junior college teacher, had become active in a teacher's association. He contended that this activity and his criticism of the administration of the school were the bases for the non-renewal of his contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school administration. The court of appeals, reversing the district
court, concluded that where a teacher claims that he has been denied
re-employment by reason of his exercise of constitutional rights, the
school, if requested, should establish a tribunal to hear the teacher's
complaint.1 0 In response to the suggestion that a teacher has a right
to a hearing even if first amendment freedoms were not involved, the
court's answer was short and direct:
[T]hat a college must always assign a cause for not renewing the
contract of any teacher on its staff, would have the legal effect of
improperly denying to colleges freedom of contract to employ
personnel on a probationary basis or under annual contracts which
are unfettered by any re-employment obligation. . . . Courts do
not make contracts for colleges or teachers any more than for any
other litigants.' 1
In a somewhat similar vein, the Eighth Circuit in Freeman v. Gould
Special School District of Lincoln County, Ark., with the current Jus7.
mouth
8.
(1971).
9.
10.
11.

Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971); Drown v. PortsSchool District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
The Court has also granted cert. in Roth v. Board of Regents, 92 S. Ct. 530
Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 944.
Id.
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tice Blackmun sitting on the case, rejected the argument that a group
of teachers in Arkansas had a right to redress for what they considered arbitrary action on the part of the school board which fired
them. 12 The opinion of the court, while denying relief, is similar to
that of the Perry court in holding that in the absence of a clear ancillary constitutional issue the teacher has no right to redress. The
Freeman court noted that in the absence of statutory or contractual
provisions restricting a school board, the board could follow any
method of review it decided upon. 3
The dissent in Freeman felt that the majority had erred in concluding that in the absence of a racial discrimination issue, the teachers had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
the Civil Rights Act.14 Referring to Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 5 Judge Lay added another factor to the question by basing
his dissent not upon tenure laws or contract theory, but rather upon
the question of "denial of the 'protection of the individual against
arbitrary action.' "6 In reference to the majority's attempt to distinguish the cases which have granted professionals, such as attorneys,
rights to review, Judge Lay argued that the "focal stake is the personal
liberty to pursue one's employment without arbitrary vilification and
reckless exclusion by the state."' 7
A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals per curiam decision affirmed
the dismissal of a college professor's complaint which was based upon
expectancy of employment and first and fourteenth amendment
grounds.' 8 The court concluded that as long as the state authority
was acting within the bounds of the Colorado statute, which gave the
Board of Trustees complete discretion, the professor had no basis
upon which to establish his claim. The court recognized the necessity of granting school boards discretion in dealing with the hiring and
rehiring of teachers. The court summarized its point of view by stating that absent statutory or contractual rights: "[O]ne has no con12. 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
13. Id. 1161.
14. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is as follows: Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
15. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
16. 405 F.2d 1153, 1163 (8th Cir. 1969).
17. Id. at 1165.
18. Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 991
(1970).
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stitutional right to a 'remedy' against the lawful conduct of another."' 9
The dissent concluded that the dismissal of the complaint was premature since it would deprive the plaintiff teacher of an opportunity
to show a potential violation of his constitutional rights.2"
A more recent case, Orr v. Trinter, has summarized the split of
authority among the circuits, and has held against the teachers.2 1 Besides deciding the issue for the Sixth Circuit, the Orr court attempted
to define the holdings of some of the other circuits. The court referred to an "expectancy of reemployment test" and dismissed it as an
unsound basis for decision. 22 The court explicitly stated that the
very purpose of the probationary period of teaching is to give the
school board sufficient discretion in its hiring and firing policy. The
failure to give reasons for dismissal is not arbitrary and it is a recognized system. 3
Some circuits have decided not to follow the Freeman or Orr decisions. The First Circuit, to a limited degree, and the Seventh Circuit
have held in favor of the teachers in the dispute over procedural due
process requirements and rehiring policies of school boards. 2
In
Drown, the First Circuit applied a balancing test and decided that
the teachers have a right to a statement of reasons for not being rehired as well as a right to access to reports submitted as evaluation
of their work. The court felt that:
[T]he interests of the non-tenured teacher in knowing the basis
for his non-retention are so substantial and that the inconvenience
and disadvantages for a school board of supplying this information
are so slight as to require a written explanation, in some detail, of
the reasons for nonretention, together with access to evaluation re25
ports in the teacher's personal file.
The court refused to agree that a teacher has a right to a hearing,
however. In a series of well argued points, the court noted that hearings might well inhibit the right of the school board to fire a teacher,
thus taking away a valid degree of discretion, by making the board
feel that the administrative fight might not be worth the effort. Secondly, the court warned that hearings might lead a school board to be
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
mouth
25.

Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330-32.
444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 133, petition for cert. filed 40 U.S.L.W. 3121 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1971).
Id. at 134-35.
Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971); Drown v. PortsSchool District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1970).
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"over-cautious in their hiring practices," thereby decreasing opportunities for employment.2" Finally, the Drown court implied that the
teachers need not be bound to the current system, since further effort
in negotiations between teachers' unions and school boards might well
eliminate much of the problem. 7
The Seventh Circuit decision of Roth v. Board of Regents represents the most extensive defense of the teachers without tenure. The
issue presented in Roth was procedural:
[W]hether the state university, in deciding not to retain a nontenured professor, must initially shoulder the burden of exposing
to the limited test ordered by the district court the reasons on
which its decision is predicated, and to that extent demonstrate that
its reasons are not impermissible, or whether the first recourse of
the professor is to attempt to establish in the judicial forum that
2
the reasons are impermissible.

8

The court held by a two to one vote that a teacher, whether tenured
or not, has a right to know the reasons for dismissal and a right to an
impartial hearing.
Unlike the decision in Perry, the right to a
hearing in Roth does not depend upon the alleged violation of ancillary constitutional rights.a
The majority in Roth did not go unanswered. Judge Duffy, dissenting, wrote an extensive opinion. The judge was careful to point
out that neither Roth's contract nor the applicable Wisconsin statute
required any form of hearing. 3 1 He contended that Roth had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal to the
Board of Regents. Judge Duffy pointed out that no reason existed for
the federal courts to become the arbiters of any and all problems facing school districts.3
Additionally, the judge reasoned that the costs
26. Id. at 1186.
27. Id. at 1187-88.
28. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 809.
30. In Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit
applied the Roth rationale to the complaint of an Illinois high school teacher. There
apparently was no allegation by the plaintiff of a violation of any of her constitutional
rights other than the right to continued employment unless she received reasons for
her contract's non-renewal and a hearing. In Fooden v. Board of Governors, 272
N.E.2d 497, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's decision to
deny two teachers relief on the ground that they had failed to state a valid claim for
relief (the relief sought in the form of a class action by the union). The court concluded that the Board's duty was limited to giving probationary teachers notice of nonretention. The teachers also appear to have failed to offer any response to the facts
as presented by the Board, and were unable to show that there was any basis to the
argument that the teachers were fired for union activity.
31.
Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1971) (dissenting
opinion).
32. Id. at 811.
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to the school boards would be prohibitive, and that implementation
of the standards set by the majority would destroy the tenure system. 3
One finds the circuits split on the question of the application of
procedural due process to the problems facing the non-tenure teacher.
There is an intermingling of various problems at various levels in the
issue. The federal courts are faced with the prospect of interfering
with the statutory and contractual system of the state schools. They
are, however, entrusted with the responsibility of guaranteeing due
process of law to all citizens. The Supreme Court has held that no
one has a right to public employment; yet, the qestion remains whether
that is really what the probationary teachers are seeking.34
THE ISSUES CONFRONTING THE SUPREME COURT

Apparent differences exist in the cases of Roth v. Board of Regents
and Freeman v. Gould. The real issue in these two cases is whether
procedural due process to the problems facing the non-tenure teacher.
One problem in attempting to reconcile these cases is the obvious fact
differences which faced the courts. In Roth there was an allegation
of a denial of first amendment freedoms. While the court expressly
limited its decision to the procedural issue, there was ever present in
the background the respect granted first amendment rights by the
courts,3 5 Although the Roth court notes this fact, the decision stands
upon the question of due process. The Freeman court, on the other
hand, was faced with an uncomfortable decision. On the record, as
expressed in that case, there appears to have been a considerable dis36
pute existing between a school principal and a group of teachers.
The board had indicated that if the principal and the teachers resolved
their differences they would rehire the teachers. The court indicated
that the case may have been improperly prepared because the initial
claim of racial discrimination was shown to be unfounded. 3 7 This inaccuracy may have affected the attitude of both the trial and appellate
3 8

courts.

Freeman v. Gould leaves many questions -unanswered. It is diffi33. Id. at 811-12.
34. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO
367 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1961).
35. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1971).
36. 405 F.2d 1153, 1155 n.2.
37. Id. at 1157.
38. The factual differences, however, do not reconcile the two cases.
Circuit in Rdtth has found an area in which it is determined to protect the
non-tenure teacher by procedural safeguards. That the court recognized

v. McElroy,

The Seventh
rights of the
its stance is

1972

Non-Tenure Teachers

cult to ignore Judge Lay's dissent. The testimony of the school
principal apparently responsible for the dismissal of the teachers certainly indicates a strong probability that arbitrary action was the cause
of the dismissal of the teachers. The court's conclusion that the issue
in Freeman is merely an internal matter may be too simple an answer.3 9 Freedom of contract presents a rational basis on which to rest
the decision. However, reliance on it alone disregards the existence of
constitutional issues in the area. The majority's attempt to distinguish cases involving other professions from that of the teacher may
be weakened by the quote referred to by Judge Lay in his dissent:
"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."40 The dissent went on to say that "officers of a State cannot
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he
fails to meet these standards." 4 1 Is Judge Lay saying merely that, in
his opinion, the action of the school board in Freeman was arbitrary?
If that is all he is saying, the difference between the Freeman case
and Sinderman v. Perry may simply be a question of facts.
While the outcome for the plaintiffs in Perry and in Freeman is
opposite, it may well be that there is no basic distinction between the
cases. Both courts appear to say that one must establish an adequate
collateral basis before he can claim a violation of the fourteenth amendment. It can be contended that the courts are in accord. Both
courts place the burden of proof upon the individual teacher. Perry
concludes that where there is an allegation of a violation of constitutional rights, the school board should provide for adequate means to
resolve the issue. 42 The Freeman court points out there was no evidence that the plaintiffs ever requested an opportunity to confront
their "accuser. ' 43 Thus, it could be implied from the facts as prealready evidenced by the circulation of the majority and minority opinions to all the
circuit's judges, and the four to four vote split on the question of a rehearing of the
case en banc (Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 810 n.10 (7th Cir. 1971) ).
Undoubtedly, the Roth decision causes problems for the school boards.
39. One must also note that in Arkansas there was no tenure system which offered
any protection to teachers (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1304(6) (1969) ).
One may
question whether the court in the majority opinion is not accepting the idea that the
absence of statutory provisions relieves the board of responsibility in developing a
system of review for its decisions.

40.

Freeman v. Gould Special School District of Lincoln County, Ark., 405 F.2d

1153, 1163 (8th Cir. 1969) quoting Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1957).
41. Id.
42. 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. 405 F.2d 1153, 1160 (8th"Cir. 1969).
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sented that, due to the record before the court, as well as the apparent
lack of thoroughness on the part of the plaintiffs in pursuing the issue
with the school board, the court felt compelled to affirm the district
court, absent statutory or contractual provisions favorable to the plaintiffs. This issue is presented: what guarantees of procedural due process do non-tenure teachers have? By placing the issue in constitutional perspective, an insight may be gained in which direction the
Court should go. No longer will a court answer that "The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him."4 4
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

In none of the cases discussed to this point has there been an attempt to persuade the court that a teacher has a right to any specific
job. The Supreme Court has noted the existence of a distinction between private and public employment. The Court in Cafeteria And
Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy stated:
[T]he state and federal governments, even in the exercise of
their internal operations, do not constitutionally have the complete
freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer. But to ackknowledge that there exist constitutional restraints upon state and
federal governments in dealing with their employees is not to say
that all such employees have a constitutional
right to notice and
a hearing before they can be removed. 45
The decision in Cafeteria Workers has been used by both proponents
and opponents of granting the rights of procedural due process to
non-tenure teachers. The case merits closer attention.
Rachel Brawner was the plaintiff in Cafeteria Workers. She was
deprived of her security clearance to work at a military installation.
Upon the refusal of the security officer to grant her access to the base,
she was offered alternative locations for work by her employer. Finding these alternatives unacceptable, she sought relief in federal court.
The issue raised was similar to that confronting the probationary
teacher-the extent of protection provided by the guaranty of due
process of law. Brawner, like the teachers, had requested a formal
hearing, but her request was denied. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court, in applying a balancing test, concluded that "The Fifth Amend44. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18
(1892).
45. 367 U.S. 886, 897 (1961).

122
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ment does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case
of government impairment of private interest."46 In addition to noting
the greater degree of discretion afforded the government in protecting
a security installation, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's interest
did not require an administrative hearing prior to the revocation of
her security clearance. The Court was careful to point out that she
was not barred from further employment. She could continue to
work for the same company she had worked for.
Closely akin to Cafeteria Workers is another security case decided
two years earlier. In Greene v. McElroy, an aeronautical engineer was
deprived of his security clearance apparently due to the affiliations of
his former wife with alleged communist agencies.4" By his loss of
security clearance, Greene was unable to find similar employment in
his field. All such jobs required some degree of security clearance.
After a number of years of administrative hearings and appeals on his
part, the Supreme Court eventually upheld Greene's right to confrontation. Unlike the situation in Cafeteria Workers, where the Court
found a basis for the expulsion of Rachel Brawner in naval regulations which had been approved by President Truman, the Court held
that: "[I]n the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the
safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." 4 8 The Court was
careful to note that it had left the issue of the effect of presidential
or congressional action undecided.
Another indication of the Court's interpretation of the limitation
upon discretionary dismissal of government employees arose in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education.4 9 While dealing with the
fifth amendment self-incrimination clause, the Court expressed a view
on the contention that no person has a right to government employment. In Justice Clark's words: "To state that a person does not
have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say
that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory
terms laid down by the proper authorities."5 0
In summary, therefore, the Court has concluded that the right to
government employment is not absolute, but the federal or state gov46.
47.

48.

Id. at 894.
360 U.S. 474 (1959).

Id. at 555.

49. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
50. Id. at 555.
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ernments are not as free to deal with their employees as is a private
employer. Some cases have required that hearings with the usual
rights of procedural due process be provided prior to termination of
employment. Where the non-tenure teacher's claim fits in the constitutional framework is the question.
There appears to have been only one passing reference by the Supreme Court to the status of a non-tenure teacher. The remark is
certainly dictum, but nevertheless is of interest. Justice Stewart, for the
majority in Shelton v. Tucker, made a passing reference to the system
of retaining teachers in Arkansas. 5 The Justice stated that interference with associational freedoms of a teacher was a greater danger
where "the teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the
disclosure must be made-those who any year can terminate the
teacher's employment without bringing charges, without notice, without hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain." 2 Although
this statement by Justice Stewart in a 1960 case is of little value as
precedent, it does indicate that, at that time, the Court may have considered the non-tenure teacher as not deserving procedural due process protection absent a claimed violation of constitutional rights such
as freedom of speech or association. Whether the Court will accept
this dictum in some manner as future policy remains to be seen.
THE CASES AND THE CONSTITUTION

As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Roth, the teacher tenure
cases have the added factor of involving the academic world. 53 Certainly the courts will exercise great care in insuring that there is no
denial of basic constitutional rights in a profession which has such a
substantial impact upon society. 4 In Jones v. Hopper,5 5 however,
the Tenth Circuit gave the discretionary rights of school boards full
force and effect. The opinion failed to recognize any real constitutional issue. In light of Cafeteria Workers, a dismissal of a teacher's complaint without a hearing appears to be improper. As dissenting Judge Seth argued, it would seem quite impossible to apply
51. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
52. Id. at 486.
53. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. For some indication of the importance the Court places in deciding questions
relating to the academic world see, Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 493
(1952).
55. Jones v.Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1331 (10th Cir. 1969).
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any balancing of interests tests when a party has been refused the
opportunity to establish a case."
To some degree it would appear
that Jones is a modem application of the Lochner v. New York rationale.5 7 Dismissing the issue as a mere contractual matter between
two parties seems to overlook the real issues involved.
A contract theory is not the sole basis for giving a school board a
free hand in negotiating with a teacher without tenure. In Jones,
Perry, and Freeman, for example, discretionary statutory authority is
vested in the various school boards. In light of the holding in Greene
v. McElroy, there may be a sound basis for stating that the nontenure teacher has no grounds for objecting to not having a general
right to a hearing or other procedural protection. However, the Supreme Court limited the Greene decision to the facts before it. The
Court held that in the absence of statutory provision, the government's
review of Greene's complaint was invalid absent more adequate procedural safeguards. 5" In the non-tenure teachers' cases, the Court is
presented with a statutory scheme which specifically provides that the
boards are granted extensive discretion to act as they see fit to preserve a good and functional system. In light of this expressed policy,
the Supreme Court may well be reluctant to overturn the legislative
scheme. The Supreme Court may find it difficult to declare that in
the words of the Slochower court, the standards established by the
boards are not "reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory." 59
The cases which have permitted the teacher's complaint to stand, or
which have implied that a complaint would stand if the teacher were
able to allege that a constitutional right rather than the question of
the competency of the teacher was at issue, would appear to be in a
stronger position to receive the approval of the Supreme Court. Cases
like Perry and Freeman have at least the superficial advantage of
preserving the existing legislative scheme while assuring the individual
teacher that the federal courts will be available for redress of a denial
of constitutional rights by the school board. As the Supreme Court
suggested in Cafeteria Workers, due process may not require the trialtype procedure in every circumstance.6 ° Lack of any crystallized
56. Id. at 1331.
57. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The analogy drawn here is
admittedly a loose one, but the importance of placing real contractual rights in their
perspective necessitates this comparison. It is suggested that a teacher's rights to contract freely are severely limited by statute and state regulation.
58. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959).
59. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
60. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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structure might facilitate compromise in those cases which would not
require a formal hearing. In the case of a teacher who has been released with good cause, it may well be to his advantage not to have a
public record of the reasons for dismissal. The ability of the court to
deal with each case individually may, therefore, serve the teacher's interest.
Undoubtedly, some proponents of a formalized process short of a
judicial hearing may argue that it is asking too much of the teacher to
go to the trouble of filing suit to receive relief. There is probably
some basis for this argument, although the number of cases which
have been filed might indicate that the teachers are not reluctant to
defend their interests when they have a substantial basis for questioning
the process which has eliminated them from the payroll.
The courts which have granted relief and have required some formal procedural protection of the non-tenure teachers have established
a tenable position in light of the Cafeteria Workers and Greene cases.
With the exception of the Jones court, there is a definite attempt on
the part of the circuits to balance the interests involved. The Seventh
Circuit in Roth has decided upon the facts presented to it that the
interest of the teacher is sufficient to merit some inconvenience on the
part of the school boards."' It may well be, as one author has suggested, that absent some formal process of redress there is little way
that a teacher will be able to discover whether a school board has in
fact denied him a contract renewal upon adequate professional
grounds.6 2 There appears to be at least some statistical basis for
claiming that a teacher's past employment record is the most important factor in securing another teaching position. 3 Are the free access to a teacher's records and the danger of permitting a school board
to bury unjust reasons for non-renewal of a contract sufficient bases to
require a hearing for a teacher? A majority of circuits have decided
that, in and of themselves, these factors are not adequate grounds
for such relief.
In light of the need to protect the interests of the teacher and yet
preserve the integrity of the school board and tenure system, the
61. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
62. Van Alstyne, Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1453 (1968).
63. Dropkin and Castiglione, Teacher Credentials: Item Preferences of Recruiters,
43 THE CLEARING HOUSE, 474, 476 (1969). The study concluded that the most im-

portant factor to teacher recruiters was the "reports of the candidates, most recent
observed teaching behavior, and the conditions under which that behavior was exhibited."
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Drown decision would appear to have some marked advantages.6 4
Drown avoids both extremes, and yet would appear to serve the interests of both the school boards and the teachers adequately. The
First Circuit would require the school board to give a statement of
reasons for dismissal and permit access to evaluation reports of the
teacher. By this method, the court is protecting the interests of the
non-tenure teacher. He is not confronted with the necessity of having
his records made public. There would also be a record of the decision of the school board which would aid the teacher in making his
decision of whether to seek judicial relief. This procedure has advantages for the school board as well. There is a degree of protection in having notified the teacher of the reasons for not rehiring him.
The board may be doing a service to the individual by informing him
of those reasons. The board can hardly complain that it is required
to go to any degree of added expense of funds and energy.
The position in Down, therefore, has the dual advantage of balancing the interests of the non-tenure teacher and the school board. The
First Circuit seems to have taken to heart the words of the Supreme
Court in Cafeteria Workers by adapting a procedure to the specific
needs of the situation.65 There is a minimal degree of general procedural protection established by the court in Drown and a conscious attempt to preserve the administrative system which the states
have decided to implement.
As recently as 1968, there was some indication that a hearing-at
least a hearing which is conducted by the school board itself-may be
of little value in protecting the rights of a teacher. In Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District, a teacher was
dismissed from his job, after receiving a hearing, for a letter he had
written to a local newspaper criticizing the school board's handling of
funds.6 6 The Supreme Court held that the teacher had the same right
to question the action of a school board as any member of the general
public. One might be inclined to argue that the hearing the school
teacher had before an apparently irate school board served no protective purpose. Conversely, it may be suggested that the crux of the
issue is that the requirement that a school board establish itself as a
review board is simply inadequate because it does not go far enough.
64. Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
65. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
66. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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To insure procedural due process should not the courts require the establishment of an impartial tribunal? There is some evidence of a
67
trend in this direction in recent developments in some states' statutes.
However, any change has generally been limited to tenure teacher's
rights. The most liberal of these provisions, which requires the active
participation of the courts, is the California system. Under that system,
if any teacher demands a hearing, the board must file a complaint in
the state court asking the court to investigate the situation and to
determine whether there were adequate grounds to merit dismissal.68
While the fact remains that this procedure is limited to one state, there
is the sound implication that a board hearing is considered too likely
to be partial to merit being entrusted with the responsibility of decision.
For the purposes of the non-tenure teacher the implications are
clear. The action of some eight states should require the courts to
take serious consideration of the fact that mere procedural due process
"guaranteed" by a board hearing may not serve any real purpose. 9
It might be in the best interests of all in the long run not to create such
hearings and require instead that the board give reasons for its nonrenewal of the contract. If the reasons are considered to be inadequate
by the non-tenure teacher, and if constitutional rights are involved, the
road to the courts will remain open; absent the necessity of pursuing
administrative redress further, the case may be resolved more quickly.
Some idea of the Supreme Court's possible attitude concerning the
necessity of a hearing for termination of government employment may
be inferred from a recent case involving a welfare recipient. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients were
entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing when the right to continue receiving payments was brought into question .7r
The circumstances of the welfare recipient and the problems facing the non-tenure
teacher are similar in that both parties are requesting a determination
of their continuation to certain public benefits-the teacher seeking
government employment and the welfare recipient seeking a means of
support from his government. However, the comparison between the
67. See e.g., WEST. ANN. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13435 to 13443 (1965); N.J. STAT.
tit. 18A §§ 6-10 to 6-30 (1971).
68. See, for an example of how the review system is intended to operate in
California, Ramey v. Board of Trustees, Coalinga Junior College District, 239 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 48 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1966),
69. NEA Research Bulletin, March, 1971, at 20-22.
70. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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plight of ,the non-tenure teacher and the welfare recipient breaks down.
The Court states:
Thus the crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in
the case of . . . the discharged government employee, . . . is that
termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits. 7
The Goldberg case gives an indication of the Court's attitude toward
an extension of procedural safeguards. The teacher undoubtedly will
be able to show some inconvenience and possibly great difficulty due
to a failure to receive a contract renewal. It is doubtful, however,
that the teacher will be able to show a deprivation of the right to a
subsistence level of income. Moreover, welfare recipients, unlike the
teacher without tenure, have a statutory basis for their claims.72 It
might also be important that the Court determined that while there
should be notice given with the reasons for termination, an opportunity
to present and cross-examine witnesses, and a right to produce evidence, there was no need to furnish counsel for the recipient nor did
the hearing have to be of a judicial or quasi-judicial type.7" Prior
involvement in the case would not preclude the same party from sitting on the hearing board as long as the official had not made the
determination being reviewed. 74 One might attempt to distinguish the
Goldberg case as applicable only to pretermination hearings, and argue that the teacher without tenure seeks review of a completed decision. It would seem, however, that the teacher requesting a hearing
is actually requesting a pretermination hearing. The non-tenure teacher
wants a determination of the facts relating to re-employment before the
job is lost. The question remains whether the teacher can show an
interest sufficient to merit review.
Another factor which has plagued this issue is the effect of a dismissal upon the reputation and future chances of employment for the
individual teacher. Admittedly, the contract that the non-tenure
teacher signs makes no provision for what the Orr court referred to as
an expectancy of future employment.7 5 Some advocates of the status
quo will undoubtedly suggest that, as is the case in other areas of employment, absent discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or similar
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Orr v.

264.
262.
270-71.
Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1971).
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factors a contract for a specific service is just that. Unlike private
industry, however, a teacher cannot simply pick up and find another
school board where he may get employment. There is a certain element of deprivation here-much more than that which faced the
Court in Cafeteria Workers. The Court will have to find a substantial interference in the interests of the teacher far outweighing
any inconvenience to the various school boards. The degree to which
the courts find that the interests of the teacher must be served above
and beyond those of the school board may well mark the degree to
which the Court will attach elements of what is referred to as due
process of law. The degree of this extension will now be considered
in detail.
In a recent article, William Van Alstyne outlined the traditional
factors usually considered to be included in the concept of procedural
due process.7 6 He suggested that general rules of operation should be
established; that in the event of a dispute a notice of charges and a
statement of facts be given to the injured party;7 7 that there be an
impartial trier of fact; that there be a right to appeal; that the parties
know the evidence and be able to confront witnesses; and, lastly, that
there be a right to counsel.78 It was his opinion that in the case of
the non-tenure teacher some combination of the above factors should
be required for due process to be assured. Some of the additional
factors which Van Alstyne would have the Court consider in evaluating
the problem presented to it were the number of teachers who do not
have their contracts renewed; whether the non-renewal of contracts
occurred during a political controversy; and the necessary impact of
76.
DUKE

Van Alstyne,

L.J. 841.

The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970

77. If the rights of the non-tenure teacher are purely contractual, absent any provision in the contract, there may be no reason beyond common courtesy why a school
board would inform a teacher that his services are no longer needed. Cf. the dissenting
opinion of Judge Stevens in Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1970): To require reasons to be given in light of the contract might be the equivalent of rewriting
it and expressly contradicting the power vested in the school board.
78. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
DUKE L.J. 841, 865 (1970).
The question of the right to counsel has not arisen in
any of the cases decided by a court and it is unlikely that it will. If the Supreme
Court were to decide that some type of formal hearing will be required, there is some
recent indication that the right to have an attorney provided for the teacher will not
be upheld. As mentioned in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970), the
Court outlines what it considered to be adequate procedural safeguards for a welfare
recipient who was in danger of losing his right to benefits. Even under these circumstances where it was clearly evident to the Court that there were no alternatives to
welfare for the plaintiff, there is no suggestion of a need to provide counsel. In light
of the specific outline provided by the Court this absence may be an indication that the
Court feels the need to provide counsel would be lacking for a non-tenure teacher.
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job relocation by a failure of the teacher to receive a new contract. 9
How the courts have handled the specific enumeration of due process
attributes and whether they have taken into account to some degree the factors suggested by Van Alstyne will be of considerable
importance in deciding the questions that face the Supreme Court on
this issue. One might preface this discussion by noting that Van Alstyne may have limited his second independent factor too greatly.
The Court should probably attempt to be aware of what we can refer to as any unusual circumstances giving rise to discrimination.
IMPARTIAL TRIER OF FACT

A considerable amount has already been said about the merits and
the disadvantages of requiring a hearing-and especially a hearing before an impartial trier of fact. With the exception of the Seventh
Circuit in Roth and Shirck v. Thomas,"' no federal court of appeals
has gone so far as to say that a teacher should generally have a right
to any administrative hearing absent alleged ancillary violations of
civil rights. Under the current statutory scheme in most states, the
Supreme Court would be making a giant step forward, disrupting the
status quo to a considerable degree if they required such a hearing.
To require a hearing in such circumstances would be insuring the
non-tenure teacher of substantially the same procedural right as the
tenure teacher possesses. The substantive standard which would be
applied would be less than the "cause" standard of the tenured
teacher, but would certainly be no small gain for the teacher. In an
earlier article, Van Alstyne suggested that an administrative hearing is
a sure way of defining the dispute and increases the probability that
unconstitutional reasons are not the bases of a decision. There would
be a more adequate record for any reviewing court if there were
hearings."'
Another commentator suggests that hearings might be dispensed
with except in the situation where the basis for non-renewal of the
teacher's contract relates to extra-curricular activities of the teacher.8 2
The school board would retain a broad degree of discretion by im79. VanAlstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 841, 872-74 (1970).
80. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971); Shirck v. Thomas,
447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971).
81. Van Alstyne, Demise of The Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
82. Frankt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 27
(1969).
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plementation of this suggestion. There would likewise be assurance
that the teacher would be protected as a person in the school system.
Arthur N. Frankt's proposal seems to suggest that we render unto the
school boards the affairs that belong there, and leave constitutional
issues in their proper perspective. Such a system would have the advantage of granting protection to the non-tenure teacher in that area
of the academic world where there is the greatest danger of a "chilling
effect" upon freedom. This suggestion would seem to be in line with
the rationale of the Perry decision in that where ancillary rights are
at issue, a hearing will be required. 8
It would seem that Frankt
wishes to see the burden of establishing the right to a hearing placed
upon the school board.8 4 That would definitely go beyond the requirements established by the Perry court. The suggestion does have
the advantage of clarifying the issues, however. In implementing
such a procedure, no party would be totally left without concrete
rights. The suggestion avoids the blanket provision of the Roth decision, and the dangers of depriving the school boards of their statutory
discretion. At the same time, the procedure would clearly encompass the question of extraneous circumstances which might have an
impact upon the situation faced by the teacher who wishes to become
involved in the community or in other school activities beyond that of
the classroom.
Above and beyond the question of requiring a hearing, the courts
would be faced with the question of the type of hearing. Can an impartial tribunal be formed by the school board or must there be the use
of outside personnel? To this time no circuit has gone so far as to
suggest that the school board cannot be an adequate judge of the issue.
In the case of tenure teachers some of the states have provided by
statute for the intervention of an impartial trier. California uses the
state court. New Jersey requires the state commissioner of education
or his appointee to make a finding of fact and a final determination of
the dispute.8 5 For a hearing to be truly valuable, there should be a
degree of insulation between those who are attempting to dismiss or
not rehire a teacher and those who decide whether such action is
merited. No one should be a judge in his own cause. The extent of
insulation would probably have to depend upon the framework of the
local school board. In some situations the local board might be as
83.
84.
85.

Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
Frankt, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 27, 40 (1969).
N.J. STAT. tit. 18A §§ 6-10 to 6-30 (1968).
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impartial a group to decide the question as would a court. It would
seem presumptuous to attempt to define any hard and clear rules in
this area. As long as there is a degree of disinterest in the body of
the tribunal, it should be adequate to protect both parties.
RULES OF PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED

Courts denying the teacher any procedural redress have relied upon
the fact that the teacher knows, when he signs a contract, that his
rights are limited by his contract and the statutory framework under
which the school board operates. If a system of formal procedure is
either adopted by the school board or is required by statute or court
order, it would be a simple process to make public the rules which
would be followed in case of a dispute. Inter-office and department
memoranda, unions, and various other associations might aid the
school board in this respect.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES

At least two courts to this time have required that a considerable
amount of the evidence -used to base a decision of non-retention of a
teacher be made available. The First Circuit has required that the
non-tenure teacher be provided with access to confidential reports."6
By implication, the "glimpse at the reasons for dismissal" suggestion
of the court in Roth would permit the teacher to view and evaluate
the school board's decision. 8 7 The courts which have decided that
the teacher is entitled to a hearing where there is some evidence of a
violation of ancillary rights would also appear to have incorporated
the notice that a teacher will be provided with the proof used to substantiate the dismissal. The Perry court specifically includes "the
right to produce witnesses and evidence and the right to confront and
's8
cross-examine witnesses produced by the opposition.
Quite obviously, the courts which have decided that the non-tenure
teacher has no right to a hearing have avoided this issue altogether.
The courts which have found the need for a hearing have not questioned the right of a teacher to produce and confront witnesses. Absent evidence and witnesses the right to a hearing would be illusory.
Interestingly, however, there exists a split between those circuits
86.
87.
88.

Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1970).
Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
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which would provide the teacher without tenure access to reports,
which undoubtedly would be used as evidence for a hearing, and
those circuits which would provide for the production of recorded evidence, but would deny the right to a hearing before a teacher's contract is terminated for professional reasons.8 9 The apparent rationale
of the Drown court would be that the non-tenure teacher's access to
the reports would enable him to make a determination of his shortcomings and to possibly prepare for judicial action.
RIGHT TO REVIEW

A point suggested by the dissent in Roth and by the majority in
Freeman offers some insight into the question of right to review.
Both opinions were critical of the apparent failure of the "alleged"
injured party to pursue what these judges viewed as alternative and
additional administrative remedies. By the fact that these cases have
arisen and have been heard in the federal courts, there would seem to
be no reluctance on the part of the courts to review the decision of a
school board. Under the Civil Rights Act if the teacher were able to
show an obvious violation of rights which would merit jurisdiction
there would be, in effect, review of the school board's decision. 90
CONCLUSION

In light of recent procedural due process Supreme Court cases,
one can only suggest that the procedural rights of the teacher without
tenure rest somewhere between those of Rachel Brawner in Cafeteria
Workers and the rights granted a welfare recipient in Goldberg v.
Kelly. In this area of procedural due process, the Supreme Court has
apparently not swayed from its use of the balancing test. The Court
has placed great emphasis on the question of what rights are being
taken away from the injured party. If the Court views the teacher's
rights as simply contractual or professional, there will probably be no
procedure required to investigate the non-renewal of a contract. If,
however, the Court determines that the state may not cease to employ
a teacher without giving reasonable grounds for the decision, the
Court might also require the state, through its school boards, to provide for procedural safeguards for state teachers.
89. Compare Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970),
and Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
90. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, for example, Freeman v. Gould Special School

District of Lincoln County, Ark., 405 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1969).
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If the Supreme Court finds the balance weighing in favor of the
teacher without tenure, in light of the Goldberg decision, there appears
to be a basis for believing that the degree of procedural guarantee
would be tailored to the specific circumstances. The standard adopted
by the Court would probably be something less than that required in
Goldberg, since there is such a disparity between the plight of the
welfare recipient and that of the teacher who fails to have a contract
renewed. By this analysis, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Roth and
Shirck have gone beyond what the Supreme Court would consider a
sufficient degree of procedural protection since the question as viewed
by the court was one of general competency of the teacher rather than
one of alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The more
moderate solution offered by the First Circuit in Drown, is a standard which the Court could accept. The teacher's right to protection
merits, at least, this minimal standard provided by the Drown decision.
BRIAN S. HUCKER

